BEIJING - The dust has mostly settled in Georgia, although Russian troops remain in the country after intervening in defense of the mostly Russian-speaking breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia.
The global geopolitical consequences are still unfolding, though, with much talk of a new cold war.
However, the crisis could be turned into an opportunity for the beginning of a new world organization. This in turn ought to start from the United States, by it setting out a clear, long-term global strategy [1].
During the Cold War the lines were clear - the Soviet Union against the West, the latter combating the "evil" communists.
President Richard Nixon between 1969 and 1974 redefined the contest by moving it from a merely ideological context to one with geopolitical overtures. That is, the issue was to oppose the Soviet Union because it posed a geopolitical danger, in addition to the ideological rivalry between communism and liberalism. As a result of this strategic switch, the US in the 1970s was able to reconcile with communist China as it recognized that the USSR was mostly a geopolitical threat, with or without the accessory ideological thrust of communism.
Nixon recognized at the end of the 1960s, while fighting a tenacious ideological enemy in North Vietnam, that the global mass appeal of communism was dwindling. The real struggle with the Soviets was for world power. North Vietnam won hearts and minds because it managed to channel all popular energy into what it successfully portrayed as a fight for national liberation against the foreign invader, be it the US or France.
China's goal was also to defeat the geopolitical reality of the Soviets, not to have paradise on Earth with the colors of Chinese communism or of American democracy.
The main issue now is to gauge the goal of the sole superpower, America. If it is monopoly, as Spengler put it, everyone will get angry. This boils down to the question of whether Georgia, President Mikheil Saakashvili and its contested territory of South Ossetia are strategic for America?
It might be tempting for the US to go after the old enemy and achieve what Bush senior in the early 1990s tried to avoid - the total dismemberment of Russia. The strategy, the know-how, the weapons and the tactics are all there, they have even been upgraded and Russia would once again become a geopolitical adversary.
However, one thing should make the Americans think hard about reverting to an anti-Russian mentality. Extremist Muslims hatched the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US. These radicals were the product of the US's fixation with the Russians - the US had assisted and trained the mujahideen to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In 2001, America realized that these radicals were the real next threat and now, after Georgia, it would be difficult to do an about-turn and say that all of a sudden the Russians are enemy number one, and the fundamentalists are only number two.
Moreover, it would be militarily unadvisable for the US to take on the Russians while they are so heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, when Pakistan is less than stable and the crisis over Iran's nuclear program persists.
Meanwhile, the US has a huge deficit and mounting economic problems and oil and gas - partly provided by Russia - are becoming increasingly expensive. This is not the time for America to take on a nuclear power sitting on major oil and gas reserves.
Moscow had most likely reached the same conclusion when it began the Georgia adventure, and it proved correct: the US was in no position to make a quick response or risk serious confrontation.
In a few months, when the new US president is settled in the White House, things might be different. Europe, especially with regard to energy, might feel it is vulnerable and tell the Americans so. This would mean greater Russian leverage over an increasingly divided European Union in which members follow their national interests, disregarding the union.
The US could believe that Europe, saved from the Soviets in the Cold War, were caving in under renewed Russian pressure. This would demand a major strategic reconsideration in the US, despite all the problems in the Middle East and economic difficulties.
At this point, however, like Russia, the US would not want to overplay its hand in Europe. The US clearly wants to remain the only superpower, enjoying now and for the next few decades, superiority in military, political, cultural and economic matters.
Even if China, for example, were to surpass America economically in the next 20 years, as some economists forecast, Beijing will not have the combined political, military and cultural clout to replace America on a global level for many more years.
America can fall only if it makes mistakes, and big ones at that.
In a forthcoming book on the Eastern Roman Empire, military strategist Edward Luttwak analyzes why the Byzantine Empire survived until the 15th century while Rome fell 1,000 years earlier. Luttwak goes into great detail to provide three reasons as to why the Byzantine Empire survived:
It learned from its enemies any time it could.
It did not pursue the former Roman strategy of annihilating its enemies.
It developed formidable political and diplomatic clout - still bearing the name today of Byzantine - which carefully played allies and adversaries for its own ends.
The United States should learn from Byzantium (Constantinople) more than from Rome, Luttwak implies.
Georgia could be a field study for America to learn to become more "Byzantine", like Moscow, the self-appointed heirs of the Byzantine Empire, and with Byzantium's historical adversaries, the people living east of Anatolia.
The issue with the crisis in the Caucasus is not about the survival of Georgia, it is about the survival of Russia.
As written elsewhere [2], Russia faces many dangers. Its ethnic Russian population is declining rapidly, its Muslim population is growing fast, suicide rates are high, there is a lack of entrepreneurship and over 80% of its exports are raw material, of which most is gas and oil.
In a few years, its production of gas and oil might not be enough to meet its own demand, so to sustain its economic model Russia will have to try to secure oil and gas from its former territory. If Russia could add 70,000 or so South Ossetians, some of these problems could be headed off.
Russia will also have to stop living just off its vast land. The present reliance on gas and oil is similar to the old Russian reliance on grain exports produced in vast aristocratic estates. The inability to modernize these estates is what brought the Soviet revolution and the end of the czars in 1917.
A collapse of energy prices, be it because of new sources of energy or a change in lifestyles, could break Russia, rendering its vast pipeline network useless. In other words, to sustain long-term growth, Russia will have to boost the entrepreneurial spirit of its population.
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 set the world on a new course. It was supposed to bring democracy and stability to the Middle East and usher in an era of cheap oil for the world. The opposite has happened.
The US, also concerned of a Russian threat, tried to place a large footprint in Central Asia, which it saw as once again being the land bridge between Asia and Europe once Afghanistan was stabilized.
The US therefore promoted "color" revolutions in Ukraine and other areas and established military bases in the former Soviet republics. However, Afghanistan has proved uncontrollable and the "color" revolutions didn't bring democracy, they led to the replacement of one dictator with another. All the same, the Russians bristled at what they saw as NATO's expansion into their backyard, and Moscow bitterly opposes the stationing of the US's missile defense shield in eastern Europe. It sees this as a provocative act.
However, these could be explained by the West wanting to guarantee the stability of Russia, which is still in the midst of political reforms and the rites of passage to becoming a "normal" country. What made no sense at all was the US and others backing the "independence" of nationalistic Kosovo from Serbia this year, something most of the world didn't want to see, let alone Russians.
Kosovo has no significance for the US and its de facto independence was more than enough for all practical purposes. Its formal declaration of independence stirred up all kinds of interpretations across the world. Some said it was a signal to Russia that the US would work for the secession of Russian territories. Others said it was aimed at China, signaling that the US would support Taiwan's independence. This was probably reading too much into things.
This brings us back to what the US could do in the current geopolitical situation. To start with, Russia does not need to be made into a strategic enemy. This carries with it, among others, the risk that Russia could fall apart, creating a huge power vacuum in Eurasia which could be filled by (radical?) Muslim populations.
The US's most urgent task is to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq. If it pulls out too soon, the situation could get even worse and destabilization could spread right into Europe. The effect this would have on energy prices and the global economy don't need to be spelled out and Russia and Iran could become emboldened.
At the same time, Russia can be politically engaged, helping it on its way to "normalization". This would mean Washington rolling back its "color" revolutions and helping find a way to deal with Russians living in Ukraine and Belarus, in addition to assisting Russia adjust its economic model.
For its part, Russia should guarantee it will not overreach in Central Asia. Besides, new territories are a poor and troublesome substitute for sound economic management at home.
The US should learn to be more Byzantine, as Luttwak suggests, and should organize some form of multi-party dialogue on Iran, bringing in the active participation of Russia, China, India and Pakistan.
In other words, it should bring to the region the experience gained over dealing with North Korea's nuclear program through the six-party talks, which have helped contained Pyongyang's threat. Dropping bombs is certainly not the answer.
With the effective engagement of Tehran, both Iraq and Afghanistan could be stabilized in a more effective and easy manner. In turn, energy prices would stabilize. The overall situation would make Moscow a lot less nervous.
This broad-brush picture may present many difficulties. Would Russia trust the US? How would Saudi Arabia react to changes in its environs? How far would Iran play along?
But most importantly, this overview presents a picture in which political alliances are not set in stone, as was the model the US inherited from the Cold War. Different interests can be juggled at the same time, as proved by the Byzantine Empire.
Washington could do worse than "move east", at least in its political mind, if not in location.
Notes
1. I have to thank Spengler for the conversations that inspired most of the present writing although Spengler might not agree with all the of the article.
2. See Anna Zafesova and Francesco Sisci Why EU and China need Russia (http://www.lastampa.it/_web/cmstp/tmplrubriche/giornalisti/grubrica.asp?ID_blog=98&ID_articolo=139&ID_sezione=437&sezione=) La Stampa, March 8, 2008 and Spengler, Americans play Monopoly, Russians chess (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH19Ag04.html) Asia Times Online, August 19, 2008. (2008-08-26 Asia Times)
