BEIJING - After the North Korean nuclear-weapon test of October 9, the leading countries of the six-party talks have initiated a blame game to point out who is in a position to receive the greatest profit from Pyongyang's action.

Conservatives in China argue that the Japanese will likely gain most from the test: a long-awaited excuse to develop Japan's nuclear capabilities and forfeit the country's pacifist constitution.

Conservatives in Japan, on the other hand, blame China for still cozying up to Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, and for having been tardy in applying strong economic sanctions against defiant Pyongyang.

In South Korea, opposition rises against President Roh Moo-hyun, holding him responsible for being too lenient with the North, and for having failed to accomplish anything substantial with the Pyongyang regime, putting the country in greater jeopardy, as now the South is also under the threat of North Korea's nuclear bombs.

The American masses divide the blame among all the other countries.

Only Russia among the members of the six-party talks remains silent, being some kind of observer.

However, although four of the countries exchange the blame among one another, they obviously share a common discontent with North Korea's behavior. None of the countries admit that they have benefited from Pyongyang's defiance. Now, North Korea is more isolated than ever as no one will defend its behavior, nor wants to be seen as an accomplice of the test.

A debate among the four surfaced after the test regarding the type of sanctions that should be issued against North Korea. Some argue for harsher actions, while others argue for more moderate ones. As of now, it is decided that there are no benefits in cooperating with Kim, while the difference in opinion lies in the decisions of how ruthless one should be to him.

It is true that the test has sparked a larger debate in China and the US about whether one should live with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Despite the harsh rhetoric, as days go by it seems that the world has to face this reality. This very acquiescence could be seen as a positive result for Kim, who has achieved de facto recognition of his country's new status, albeit at the cost of any support his country had previously.

China, the ally that fought for North Korea in 1950, has for the first time joined sanctions against Pyongyang, a hostile move on its part. The China-North Korean alliance is in effect broken.

Kim has come down to this because he lost his trust in China. He felt that Beijing was not supporting him, but instead supported the US and Japan in cornering him, thus leaving him only one way: to support himself.

However, it is hard to say whether, from a purely defensive point of view, North Korea is better off now with the atomic bomb but without friends than before, without the bomb but still with a friend like China, however questionable might be its friendship to Kim.

In fact it is also questionable whether the bomb has increased North Korea's security at all. The reason the US refrains from a tactical strike against North Korea is not fear of the bomb, but concern about the thousands of guns pointed at the South and at sprawling Seoul. It would be impossible to eliminate all such weapons, and even a few surviving cannons could kill thousands of South Koreans and ravage its booming economy. The bomb, if anything, makes the guns even less tolerable and brings new urgency to the old question of the political survival of the North Korean regime. Should Kim survive? If so, how should one accommodate him? The easy answer now more than ever is: no, he cannot be allowed to survive.

One can think otherwise; after all, the US accommodated India, which became a nuclear power in 1998, although that was before September 11, 2001, and involved a democratic country that was, and is still considered, dependable. But North Korea is different. To accommodate Pyongyang's nuclear power, the US needs to revise its policies heavily, which will create a huge snowball effect.
If one turns a blind eye to Pyongyang's bomb, it will be even harder to press against Iran's nuclear program, especially now that in the administration of US President George W Bush there are people saying more loudly that Iran's support is necessary to stabilize Iraq.

If Pyongyang can have its bomb, Japanese militarists will be harder to restrain. This in turn would make the Chinese even more uncomfortable, and South Koreans too may aspire to their own bomb. This could be especially serious in the next 10 years. In this time span, China's gross domestic product (GDP)should overcome the Japanese GDP, taking away Japan as a dominant power of the region, a position that it has held for more than 100 years. This is something that is causing and will continue to cause tension and instability in Japan and in the region. If to this one adds the Japanese drive to become a nuclear power, the new South Korean nationalism, and the reborn Chinese pride and nationalism in its rise as a great power, one can see a sure recipe for disaster.

Tension would increase with every passing year, and as soon as China approaches the instant of its economic surpassing of Japan, Japanese frustration could increase even more, as China glides high and Japan slips back. It could be a strong temptation to make up the economic difference with atomic weapons.

Like a runaway train, this situation can be stopped only if enough time is granted. When tension will have reached boiling temperature it will be very hard, if not impossible, to stop it.

All this makes it necessary to stop the North Korean nuclear program now, and reverse it. The point is, nobody knows an easy way to achieve this.

By one theory the easiest solution would be Kim's "extraction", which would cost less human suffering than other approaches. But Kim holds his people's lives as human shields as if saying: "If you try to do something to me I am going to kill my people." A very secretive web of loyalty surrounds him, making it virtually impossible to plot to take him away.

The option of fiercer containment of Pyongyang's economy seems easier to achieve. China provides some 70% of North Korea's energy, 50% of its food; squeeze those supplies and you squeeze North Korea. But this pressure by China must be applied gently and in full agreement with all its neighbors. It must be gentle because a sudden shock could trigger a fierce reaction from Pyongyang, which could bombard Seoul and shoot missiles into Japan, something that would cause the collapse of the Tokyo stock market, and the slide of markets throughout the world.

It must be in full agreement of all powers involved in the talks, because North Korea might want to start a game of pitching one country against another, and China doesn't want to hit North Korea on its own only to find all the other parties cuddling up to Kim again.

If this can be done properly, then Kim's test will turn out to be a blessing in disguise. The agreement to squeeze North Korea slowly into remission would create greater cooperation on delicate security matters among China, Japan, South Korea and the US. This cooperation could be the backbone of security in Asia for this century and could help lessen the tension between China and Japan in those delicate years of economic readjustments between those two countries. Kim will have contributed to this by being the sacrificial victim of this grand peace process.

But it could all go awry. Kim Jong-il, the old master of surprise and trickery, could astonish us all by breaking this holy ring around him by announcing that he has decided to give up the bomb, that he will readmit United Nations nuclear inspectors, and that he will open a frontier to cooperation with South Korea.

However, unfortunately for him, he doesn't seem as smart as he claims to be. (2006-12-19 Asia Times)