BEIJING - What would happen if tomorrow a few US fighters bombed all known North Korean facilities engaged in the production of nuclear weapons? Would Pyongyang retaliate? Would it fire missiles at Japan or bombard Seoul? Or would it just shout and cry and do nothing?
Would Kim Jong-il's political career survive the attack? Would all the generals survive as well? How would the new peace-prone South Korean government cope with a US attack that was not agreed upon?
What would China do in this predicament that would, in one stroke, drastically rearrange the political geography of the region?
These are perhaps the real big questions of the day, despite the lingering concern for Iraq and new worries raised by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Iraq, despite some people's protests and US blunders, will be an extensive project, and peace will be won only in the long run. SARS is no plague and its implication for the internal and international politics of China are medium-term, after the disease is brought under control.
But concern surrounding North Korea is more immediate, and Pyongyang's intentions are not yet clear.
Early this week some South Koreans argued that Pyongyang was willing to drop its nuclear plans. "The sources said North Korea proposed, on the first day of the talks, a package of exchanges with the United States, offering to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for steps by the United States to move toward normal relations with the North," the Joong Ang Daily reported on Sunday.
Just a few hours earlier, on Saturday, the North Koreans had been stonewalling Seoul's demands to drop their nuclear plans. "We made it clear that we can never accept North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. We emphasized that the North should dismantle nuclear weapons, if it had any, as well as its nuclear facilities," South Korean government spokesman Shin Eun-sang said in Pyongyang.
The conflicting statements came after the breakdown of the talks among North Korea, the United States and China that were held last week in Beijing.
On Friday a commentary in the People's Daily stated: "It can be predicted that the tripartite talks, in the first step they will try to get to know about each other, the negotiation will not succeed at one go. Even if it breaks down once it starts, the situation will not become tense immediately, it is still too early to talk about possible American use of force against North Korea." Yet the paper, a mouthpiece of the Chinese leadership, warned against any possible US preemptive attack on the North Korea. It was a sign that Beijing considered such an attack possible.
From the Chinese perception, the North Koreans had come to Beijing last week not to cut any deal but rather to scout out US intentions. The head of their delegation was too low, a mere vice director general, who could not make any decision, he would only bring back news. The breakdown was, as the Chinese put it, "wind which not necessarily will bring rain".
The Chinese were in fact trying to calm down the Americans, who are growing very upset about North Korean brinkmanship. And it is not only a matter of sensitivity. Many Americans do believe that the lesson Pyongyang has drawn from the Iraq war is that it must possess weapons of mass destruction in order to make a US attack on North Korean very costly (see for instance "China's mediation backfires on North Korea" by Nayan Chanda, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, April 28).
They don't believe that Pyongyang wants to trade its nuclear weapons for anything, as the nuclear threat is the only life insurance for the regime. China has been arguing that the North Korean leaders have an interest in doing business with the US, as this could provide the necessary lifeline for the country. This is certainly true provided there is mutual trust, which is not there. In a nutshell: The US does not trust and won't do business with a nuclear Pyongyang, and Pyongyang doesn't trust and won't do business with the US without itself possessing nukes. One can argue that trust can be built, the North Koreans could be restrained, a bigger North Korean fish could be brought to the table. But there are further complications on the matter.
On April 12 South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, hosting a Trilateral Commission luncheon, argued that dialogue with the North is the only option. South Koreans at the meeting argued that in the past years in the South the perception of the North has dramatically changed. The younger generation feels that Pyongyang ought to be pitied and thus helped, it can't be considered a threat. Moreover, Japan feels that it can't rely only on the United States for its security and it must build its own security (see In Beijing, diplomatic opportunities abound, April 19).
Then, if Japan will take care of its own and the South thinks war against the North is not an option, what is the use of the US forces in South Korea and Japan? Is the United States redundant in East Asia?
One can make up any kind of justification, saying that for Japan two forces (its own and the US one) are better than one (the simple US one). For South Korea one can say that the US presence is still a guarantee of stability. But the truth of the matter is: if the United States can't solve the nuclear issue in Pyongyang, Japan will grow uninterested in US intervention and it will think that it has to take things in its own hands.
Many things are actually occurring behind the scenes. Japanese hawks are holding more frequent talks with Chinese hawks on the solution to the North Korean issue. And priorities are different. China doesn't want the collapse of North Korea, which would plunge 20 million poor North Koreans on to the shoulders of China's already economically battered northeast; thus a nuclear North Korea is better than a collapsed North Korea. For Japan the issue is to keep North Korea at bay, preventing the launch of any threat, by word or by action. For South Korea the issue is to assure the world that the peninsula is stable and no war is going to erupt. The US is afraid of nuclear proliferation, thinking that Pyongyang could sell nuclear material or weapons as it now sells heroin and amphetamines (see North Korea: Hand in the cookie jar, April 29), and it is concerned that its regional position could be at stake. North Korea wants to prop up its regime and its military aristocracy, thus it needs money to pay off the generals while showing off to the world its starving population (which has to stay famished for propaganda purposes). The bomb could well be the guarantee that nobody will molest North Korea's current order and the perks of blackmail on its own people and on the region.
It is a very complicated tangle, which however could turn up very simple if one were first to bomb the North Korean nuclear facilities, and then immediately offer Pyongyang enough carrots to keep it calm, refraining from reaction and from collapse. But nobody knows if after the bombing there could prevail in Pyongyang a self-destructive pride that would dive the country into war, or a self-preservation instinct to keep things low-key. Not many people would be willing to check it out, because such a gamble could ignite South Korean protests. Thus everybody pushes for North Korea to disarm, something that is not taking place.
At this juncture anybody could lose self-control and make a mistake, which would mandate China's unhindered attention, but as SARS is threatening the country's economy and stability, nobody can care for anything else.
This stall could well go on for months. In the meantime Japanese, Chinese and South Koreans will increase their exchanges and the United States will grow more nervous. Certainly Washington has its hands full with Iraq, while Afghanistan is far from stabilized and friction with France is still hot. The US economy shows enough signs of fatigue as things are without taking on another difficult bundle such as North Korea. But the present US administration has proved more than once it is willing to act very conventionally, and this also could put a new spin on everything. (2003-04-30 Asia Times)
