BEIJING - It is the biggest political earthquake since the time of Tiananmen in 1989. On Sunday both the Chinese minister of health, Zhang Wenkang, and the newly appointed mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, were demoted and blamed for the mishandling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis, which is tarnishing the prospects of high economic growth in China this year.
For a couple of weeks, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had been preaching transparency and collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). However, WHO officials did not stop complaining about a lack of information and cooperation from their Chinese counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese authorities had been under-reporting cases of SARS, thus helping the spread of the disease in the country and undermining international confidence in China as a responsible member of the international community.
There were conflicting messages coming from Beijing: one preaching collaboration and one opposing it. The two demotions should now save some face for the government and, one hopes, signify the beginning of the long-awaited concerted and transparent effort from Chinese authorities against the spread of the disease.
The demotions are an important signal to the medical staff on the front lines of the battle against SARS. Some doctors have been refusing to treat patients suspected of being infected with SARS. Possible SARS cases were being turned away by hospitals with the excuse that the patients were unable to pay their fees. In reality, the health system was not prepared for the crisis and the medical staff were afraid of being infected. On Sunday the news conference held by Deputy Health Minister Gao Qiang seemingly turned over a new leaf. For the first time since the start of the epidemic last November, China has been straightforward in its attitude, promising resolute measures and daily updates of the situation.
However, there is not complete transparency yet. China's system of classifying SARS cases is not the same system promoted by WHO. China's system of prevention has difficulties coping with sick people in the countryside, where the hospitals and doctors are few and are ill-prepared for this type of emergency. Moreover, Chinese health officials have complained bitterly about the lack of collaboration from the military institutions, which tried to cover up and minimize the extent of the disease within the enormous military sector. Thus there is also the possibility that in the next hours or days more heads may roll to mollify vocal international and domestic critics and try to regain some of the confidence lost in the past months. Drastic measures appear necessary, such as the closure of all schools in the capital, a system of quarantine for the areas suspected of infection and widespread use of protective masks. More than 700 confirmed and suspected cases indicate that the situation in Beijing is quite serious, as the first case was announced on March 1.
Demotions notwithstanding, the crisis continues and underlines a strong deficiency not of any particular official but of the government bureaucracy, which has proved itself again to be unable to cope with emergencies. It echoes the US spy-plane incident of April 2001, when the government had serious problems coming up with a prompt response to the pressing US requests for a solution.
The Chinese bureaucracy of today is arranged so as not to give a large amount of power to one man. This is to avoid the excesses experienced during the years of Mao Zedong, when Mao could do and undo whatever he wished without any government checks. The present system in effect forestalls any dictatorship but impedes swift reaction to virtually any emergency. The system is geared for stability: reaching a large consensus on any given policy. This makes it cumbersome, although stable and quasi-democratic, in the sense that any policy has a very wide support among the hierarchy. However, there are no clear limits to the power exercised by top leaders and there is no opposition to any given policy, as any voice in the one-party system will be accounted for and included in the decision process. The system then folds and buckles under sudden threats and pressures, and thus can't effectively withstand the challenges of the fast-moving globalized system.
Beijing's evolving attitude toward SARS is a prime example of the flaws in the Chinese political system. It was a simple disease for which no politician could have been reasonably held culpable. But because of the system, nobody asserted the government's responsibility to its people and the world with the initial outbreak in November in Guangdong province. When it broke out, the first reaction was to hide it. Once hidden and covered up, it was necessary to keep covering up, to hide the former miscalculation. The practice had arguably worked in the past with chicken flu. Only this time it was more serious and soon got out of hand. A similar pattern was experienced during the spy-plane crisis when China had wished to resolve the issue under the table and was shocked and unable to react when the US made it open.
China can't afford this clumsiness, and thus a reform of the political system has become a priority that can't be postponed for too long. However, first China will have to recover some of the face it has lost, by bringing SARS under control. This will take months, if not years, unless a miraculous vaccine is found. In the meantime this will be an opportunity for Hu Jintao to prove his mettle. If he manages the situation well from here on, he will become almost invincible and could then implement reform within the system.
So far the US seems supportive of the new attitude taken by China. Despite SARS, the US talks with North Korea are still scheduled to be held in Beijing this week, a major sign of support at a time when almost all foreign delegations have canceled visits to China for fear of the deadly virus. (2003-04-22 Asia Times)
