BEIJING - Chinese diplomacy is the first victim of a North Korean missile that landed in the Sea of Japan 35 miles off the South Korean coast just hours before the inauguration of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. The test launch occurred on Monday, a day before world leaders gathered in Seoul to witness the inauguration.

In past months Beijing has been the staunchest advocate of dialogue and a peaceful approach toward Pyongyang. This stand was backed by outgoing South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, who devised the Sunshine Policy of talks with the North, and by Kim's successor Roh. The United States had a vested interest in a softer line on North Korea, allowing Washington to concentrate on the Iraqi crisis. President George W Bush played down the North Korean threat, calling it a "diplomatic showdown". The Bush administration sent a host of appeasing messages to Pyongyang, pledging to resume and even increase its aid to the poverty-stricken country and not responding to Pyongyang's belligerent rhetoric.

However, Bush also refused the offer of direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, talks that were advocated by China. North Korea, for its part, pursued the political aim of downgrading other countries' involvement in the issue, such as Japan and South Korea, and essentially forcing Washington into talks through threats. The offer of talks with North Korea was reiterated on Monday during meetings between US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Chinese leaders. But the United States is pressing for multilateral talks, which would test North Korea's complex web of ties with its neighbors and force it into reforms.

Monday's missile severely weakened any call for talks, and there remains a political void hampering any decision (see US: Political war on multiple fronts , January 24). There is no political framework nor political consensus among the main actors in this drama about what kind of initiative could be taken with North Korea.

Japan is extremely nervous about the possibility of a North Korean missile flying over its territory, and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi went to Seoul on Tuesday "to strengthen the rickety tripartite alliance set up to quell the saber rattling from Pyongyang", the Asahi Shimbun reported the same day. Opinion in South Korea is divided between those who are nearly as (or more) concerned about US military presence in their territory as they are with the North Korean threat, and those who never believed in the Sunshine Policy and now find all their suspicions confirmed.

But China is in the worst position. It was the one country that still had some leverage over North Korea, but it failed to deliver. The West has accepted the idea that Beijing is no longer as influential with Pyongyang as it was 20 or 30 years back, but still Beijing has not set its mind about how to handle North Korea. Beijing clings to its status quo position, favoring slow but steady progress in the North Korean economy that would ease future reunification. But day after day Kim Jong-il works at burning all the bridges between him and the status quo. Thus, while there is no political agreement on the future of the Korean Peninsula, or on the costs of a future settlement for the North, there is also no longer a status quo to go back to.

This is the paradox of the situation Kim Jong-il seems keen on fully exploiting. China, Japan and South Korea do not wish to see North Korea disappear off the map, for they do not want to bear the huge costs of reunification, of supporting the poor Northerners or hosting waves of refugees.

In the face of this situation Kim Jong-il's actions are helping build a united front around and against him:
Roh was humiliated by the missile launch. The day of his presidential inauguration turned into a show for Kim Jong-il in which the South was portrayed as not important, or the next target of the North's aggressive strategy.
Japan once more was the chosen victim, as the missile flew very close to the trajectory of one that almost hit Japanese territory five years ago.
US offers were rejected, as Pyongyang chose to escalate the tension further.

China's interest in a status quo that postpones difficult questions about the reunification of the Korean Peninsula or the stationing of the US troops became seriously jeopardized.

The daring actions of North Korea have worked to eliminate timidity as an option: there must be a comprehensive solution for the security of the Korean Peninsula that goes beyond the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. The hundreds or thousands of North Korean missiles, which could be fired in any direction, are a danger to the regional security even if without any nuclear payload.

In the short run, as there is no clear political objective on the North Korea problem, either by any single state or by all states together, the solution seems to be to drag it out until the Iraqi war is over. (This incidentally puts further pressure on finishing the war in Iraq as early as possible.) However, the policy of appeasement with North Korea is not the best course and could hit China, the country keenest on appeasing Pyongyang, the hardest. F W Mote in his 1999 book Imperial China argues that the Song Dynasty used a policy of appeasement with the northern Liao Dynasty (pp 112-118). The Song reckoned that it was cheaper to pay off the Liao than to start a complex and expensive military program to counter the Liao threats. In long run, however, Mote argues, this political choice helped weaken the Song Dynasty and brought it to an end.

North Korea can't bring China to an end, but its saber-rattling could certainly sour relations between China and Japan and the United States, and this would be highly detrimental to China. (2003-02-26 Asia Times)