BEIJING - Once upon a time, when they fought the common enemy of imperialism and when the son of the supreme leader Mao Zedong, along with a million of his countrymen, died defending that land, their ties were officially reported to be as like "lips and teeth" - one would die without the other. Now the reality is very different, and although the official rhetoric has not changed, as South Koreans elect a new president China and North Korea are facing a moment of truth in their relationship - so much so that just as in the 1950s Beijing decided to wage war for the defense of Pyongyang rather than for the conquest of Taipei, the greatest tension in the region is with North Korea and not with Taiwan.
The Sino-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) alliance has been sliding for months, just as the new policy of moderate liberalization of North Korea has gained momentum and appears indispensable for the proud North. The first massive contrasts came with the railway line. China, South Korea and Japan favored a track that moved to China's northeast after going through North Korea. Pyongyang and Moscow preferred a track moving directly to Vladivostok and skipping China altogether. For a link with the South, Pyongyang wanted the line to go through a deserted mountain pass in the middle of the peninsula, while South Korea wanted simply to renovate the old line going through Seoul. In other words the North wished to use the railway to hook up with Japan and Russia while minimizing contacts with the South and China. Russia and Japan were farther away and their contagious politics was easier to cure and prevent than the political infection coming from neighboring China and South Korea.
On these points Pyongyang's concern was understandable. The stability of the North was important for China and the South, both unwilling to see the sudden collapse of North Korea and being then confronted with the drama of 22 million starving North Koreans to feed for decades. Then relations turned really sour a few months ago on the issue of a special economic zone in North Korea. The SEZ had been strongly favored by China as it explained to the DPRK that SEZs had been the first trigger of Chinese economic development. Yet its location was crucial. China and the South pushed for the choice of an area between the two Koreas, so as to siphon in capital from South Korea and ease the future reintegration of the peninsula.
North Korea, however, favored an area on the border with China, something bitterly rejected by Beijing. China feared that an SEZ at the North Korean border would attract Chinese capital away from the old industrial belt of its northeast, badly in need of financial support to relaunch its factories. Furthermore, the DPRK had been spinning up the rhetoric about the union of all Koreans, thus opening the old wound of the 2 million to 3 million ethnic Koreans living in Chinese territory and holding Chinese passports. In other words, in Beijing's eyes an SEZ on the North Korean border could kindle all kinds of troubles, both economic and ethnic, something that Beijing would hate to see.
To Pyongyang, however, it seemed that Chinese capital had fewer strings attached than South Korean capital. China would never seriously think of "conquering" North Korea, while patriotism among Chinese-Koreans could be stirred up to Pyongyang's advantage, and the 100,000 North Korean refugees in China could be brought back under Pyongyang's umbrella. This last had been a major irritant for Pyongyang, which had been pressing Beijing for their return, but Beijing had turned down the request out of humanitarian reasons and broader political considerations. China doesn't want to look like an accomplice in an infamous repression of poor and hungry people, and it thinks that helping out refugees who can make their living in China and maybe smuggle some money back to North Korea can actually help the DPRK.
For all of these reasons, Beijing answered in the negative when Pyongyang approached it on the project of an SEZ headed by Chinese businessman Yang Bin to be established on the border. Beijing did not explain too much, tried to keep things low-key, and it came out with the line that Yang Bin was not too clean and the idea had some economic problems.
But it was very clear that Yang Bin was not the real issue - Beijing did not want Pyongyang to proceed with the SEZ. Pyongyang did not see, or decided not to see, the reality behind Beijing's words and took them at face value. It undertook to give Yang Bin a North Korean passport and restarted the process of SEZ, thinking that local authorities in Shenyang, Yang Bin's Chinese base, would work against Beijing. These moves further irritated Beijing, especially the latter. Shenyang authorities had to be completely purged in late 2000 after they were found to be in business with local and international crime syndicates. In a way North Korea, rather than backing down, was spinning further trouble within China's territory, pitting local Shenyang authorities against Beijing central authorities. Things were too serious and Beijing had to send a very clear message despite risking some general embarrassment: it arrested Yang Bin, who held a Dutch passport along with a Chinese one. The official reason was tax fraud.
The North Koreans then sent a vice minister to Beijing trying to sort things out and seeking Yang's liberation, but the trip was a failure, although Yang's life was guaranteed. That was the end of the matter for Beijing, but not for Pyongyang, which was faced with the usual pressing problem - lack of cash. (2002-12-19 Asia Times)
